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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Kathryn Laura Blake appeals from her conviction for conspiracy to commit 
grand theft by extortion. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 A grand jury indicted Blake for conspiracy to commit grand theft by 
extortion and grand theft by extortion.  (R., pp. 37-39.)  The indictment listed the 
following overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy: 
1.  On or between March 2014 and May 2014, Patrick Segundo 
Oar and Kathryn Laura Blake communicated on the phone, in 
person and in writing, during which communications in part, 
Patrick Segundo Oar gave Kathryn Laura Blake directions; 
2.  On or between April 2014 and May 5, 2014, Patrick Segundo 
Oar provided a letter to Kathryn Laura Blake to deliver to 
another; 
3.  On or about April 30, 2014, Kathryn Laura Blake visited an 
individual at a business in Boise, Ada County, Idaho; 
4.  On or about April 30, 2014, Kathryn Laura Blake delivered said 
letter to the individual; 
5.  On or about April 30, 2014, Kathryn Laura Blake arranged to 
pick up a payment/US Currency on the following Monday; 
6.  On or about April 30, 2014, Kathryn Laura Blake provided a fake 
name and her phone number to this individual; 
7.  On or about May 5, 2014 Kathryn Laura Blake met again with 
this individual and took the “payment” of US Currency. 
 
(R., p. 38.) 
 The state moved to consolidate Blake’s and Oar’s cases on the basis that 
“the facts, evidence and witnesses are the same in each case.”  (R., pp. 41-42.)  
The district court granted the motion.  (R., p. 43.)   
Although Oar’s motion is not in the record, Blake joined Oar’s motion for 
relief from prejudicial joinder.  (R., p. 72.)  The basis of Blake’s motion was a 
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claim that she would be prejudiced by the introduction of evidence of Oar’s 
statements to the police regarding the dangerousness of Ponce-Alba, the drug 
dealer on whose behalf Oar and Blake were trying to extort payment of drug 
debts, and did not want Oar’s knowledge of Ponce-Alba’s dangerousness 
imputed to her.  (Tr., p. 47, L. 16 – p. 64, L. 20.)  The prosecutor responded by 
asserting that the state was not relying on Oar’s statements regarding Ponce-
Alba’s personal dangerousness to show that the letter Blake delivered was 
threatening as much as it was relying on the overall scenario of the letter being 
an effort by a drug trafficker to collect a drug debt and the circumstances of its 
delivery and attempt to collect the money.  (Tr., p. 64, L. 22 – p. 74, L. 16.)  The 
state also argued that the evidence of Oar’s knowledge was admissible against 
Blake as a co-conspirator.  (Tr., p. 86, L. 14 – p. 88, L. 21.)   
The district court denied the motion to sever.  (10/21/14 Tr., p. 17, L. 3 – p. 
21, L. 19; R., p. 89.)  First it concluded that there was no showing of a potential 
confrontation violation, because there was no showing that any statement by 
either defendant was facially incriminating of the other.  (10/21/14 Tr., p. 17, L. 18 
– p. 19, L. 12.)  The district court also concluded that Oar and Blake were not 
presenting antagonistic defenses.  (10/21/14 Tr., p. 20, L. 23 – p. 21, L. 9.)  The 
district court concluded that it was possible1 that evidence of Oar’s statements 
would be admitted against him but not against Blake, but that the potential unfair 
                                            
1 The district court specifically reserved ruling on the admissibility of evidence of 
Oar’s statements to law enforcement regarding Ponce-Alba.  (10/21/14 Tr., p. 19, 
L. 23 – p. 20, L. 2.)  If the evidence was admissible against Oar but not Blake, 
then the court would give a limiting instruction.  (10/21/14 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 1-9.) 
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prejudice from limited admission of such evidence could be cured by appropriate 
instructions.  (10/21/14 Tr., p. 19, L. 19 – p. 20, L. 22; p. 21, Ls. 10-20.) 
When the state called Detective Bruner at trial, the district court, outside 
the presence of the jury, inquired about whether the state intended to admit 
evidence of Oar’s statements through the detective.  (Tr., p. 468, Ls. 5-18.)  The 
prosecution asserted that it did intend to admit evidence of Oar’s statements to 
Detective Bruner, but asserted that those statements were in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.  (Tr., p. 468, L. 19 – p. 477, L. 15.)  As part of its argument the state 
presented an offer of proof from the detective.  (Tr., p. 474, L. 17 – p. 475, L. 21.)    
Blake objected to admission of the testimony, and asserted that a limiting 
instruction would be inadequate to cure the prejudice.  (Tr., p. 477, L. 16 – p. 
485, L. 20 (including the prosecutor’s response).)  The district court conditionally 
admitted the evidence against both Oar and Blake, subject to reconsideration 
and an appropriate remedy if the evidence should ultimately fail to support the 
admissibility of the evidence against Blake.  (Tr., p. 485, L. 21 – p. 486, L. 25.)  
The district court later concluded that the evidence supported admission of the 
evidence as in furtherance of the conspiracy.  (Tr., p. 856, L. 20 – p. 857, L. 2.) 
At the conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the 
conspiracy count, but hung on the grand theft count.  (R., p. 246.)  The district 
court entered judgment imposing but suspending a sentence of 10 years with two 
years determinate and ordering probation.  (R., pp. 251-57.) 
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ISSUES 
 
 Blake states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in not granting the motion for relief 
from prejudicial joiner [sic]? 
 
2. Did the district court err in admitting over objection evidence 
against Katie that Omar told Mr. Oar that he wanted to kill 
Detective Bruner and the confidential informant as 
statements in furtherance of the conspiracy and in admitting 
over objection evidence against Katie regarding Omar’s drug 
activities and the State’s investigation thereof including 
evidence of the use of the CI and the danger to the CI as 
Katie was unaware of any of this information and it could not 
have played a role in her involvement or non-involvement 
with a conspiracy or in her interactions with MD? 
 
3. Did the district court err in failing to give a limiting instruction 
as to evidence admissible against Mr. Oar but not against 
Katie? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Blake failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when 
it concluded that statements by Oar to Detective Bruner were in 
furtherance of the conspiracy? 
 
2. Has Blake failed to show error in the admission of evidence about the 
activities of and investigation into the trafficking conspiracy headed by 
Ponce-Alba because it was relevant to Oar’s and Blake’s conspiracy to 
extort money from those who owed money to Ponce-Alba? 
 
3. Because the evidence was admissible against both Oar and Blake, has 
Blake failed to show error in the denial of the severance motion which was 
based on the premise that the evidence was not admissible against 
Blake? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Blake Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Concluded That Statements By Oar To Detective Bruner Were In Furtherance Of 
The Conspiracy 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The state argued that evidence of Oar’s communications with Detective 
Bruner regarding the investigation of Ponce-Alba’s trafficking conspiracy, made 
when Oar’s and Blake’s conspiracy to extort money from those who owed Ponce-
Alba drug debts was extant, was admissible against both Oar and Blake as 
statements in furtherance of their conspiracy.  (Tr., p. 468, L. 19 – p. 477, L. 15.)  
In support of this argument, the state proffered the following offer of proof by 
Detective Bruner: 
Your Honor, the best explanation I can give you is that the 
allegations of murder were only a means to an end; in other words, 
those allegations were raised by Mr. Oar in an attempt to get me 
into the same room with him, and then every conversation 
subsequent to that point was an effort by Mr. Oar to elicit 
information from me to confirm facts he believed to be true 
regarding the drug trafficking investigation. 
  
 So he would offer a name, for example, such as an 
informant or one of the other [trafficking] co-conspirators or perhaps 
a [trafficking] co-conspirator’s girlfriend and attempt to gain a 
response from me, either verbally or non-verbally, to confirm what 
he suspected to be true to help the game plan he had on the side, 
which was in fact to collect money from these people. 
 
 In other words, Mr. Oar, it’s my belief, was attempting to 
determine whether or not I was still involved in investigating any of 
these other people that were not in custody to, if you will, evaluate 
the risk to himself by sending Ms. Blake out to start collecting the 
money.  In other words, if I were still in contact with these people, 
he was not going to send [Blake] out to collect money because it 
would pose a risk to himself and [Blake] being discovered. 
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(Tr., p. 474, L. 22 – p. 475, L. 20.)  Both before admission (based on the offer of 
proof) and after, the district court held that evidence of Oar’s efforts to insert 
himself into the trafficking investigation was admissible against both co-
conspirators because a jury could conclude that such was in the course and 
furtherance of the conspiracy.  (Tr., p. 485, L. 21 – p. 486, L. 25; p. 856, L. 20 – 
p. 857, L. 2.) 
 On appeal Blake argues that this evidence was inadmissible “because the 
State had no evidence that [she] was ever aware of any of these things.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 21.)  She cites no law in support of her argument, however, 
and therefore has failed to show error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of 
evidence. A decision to admit or deny such evidence will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion.”  State v. Harris, 141 
Idaho 721, 724, 117 P.3d 135, 138 (Ct. App. 2005).  “We will not disturb a trial 
court’s decision to admit [co-conspirator] statements so long as there is sufficient 
evidence to permit the trial court reasonably to infer that there existed a 
conspiracy.”  State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 485, 873 P.2d 122, 130 (1994) 
(internal quotations omitted).  See also State v. Ingram, 138 Idaho 768, 771, 69 
P.3d 188, 191 (Ct. App. 2003) (“A trial court’s admission of co-conspirator 
statements will not be disturbed on appeal so long as there is sufficient evidence 
from which a trial court may reasonably infer the existence of a conspiracy.”).   
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C. Evidence Of Oar’s Interactions With Detective Bruner Was Admissible 
 
 Statements are not hearsay if made “by a co-conspirator of a party during 
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”  I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E).  “Evidence 
of statements made by co-conspirators is admissible if there is some evidence of 
the conspiracy or promise of its production.”  State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 693, 
201 P.3d 657, 666 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Before admitting a co-conspirator’s statement over an objection that 
it does not qualify under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), a court must be 
satisfied that the statement actually falls within the definition of the 
Rule. There must be evidence that there was a conspiracy involving 
the declarant and the nonoffering party, and that the statement was 
made “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”  
 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).  
The district court concluded, based on the offer of proof, that the evidence 
regarding Oar’s interactions with Detective Bruner was admissible because those 
interactions were during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. (Tr., p. 
485, L. 21 – p. 486, L. 25.)  After hearing the evidence the district court 
reaffirmed that holding, saying that the state’s evidence showing that the 
interactions were during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy 
“connected it up.”  (Tr., p. 856, L. 20 – p. 857, L. 2.)  Because the district court 
applied correct legal standards and the evidence supports the ruling that the 
evidence is admissible under the co-conspirator hearsay exception, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence against Blake.   
 On appeal Blake argues the evidence was inadmissible “because the 
State had no evidence that [she] was ever aware of any of these things.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 21.)  Blake cites no law that this was a relevant 
 8 
 
consideration for admission of evidence under the co-conspirator hearsay 
exception.  “A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument are 
lacking.”  State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 257, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)).  Because 
Blake has cited no authority for the proposition that knowledge of the co-
conspirator’s statements is a condition of admissibility, the argument that the 
district court misapplied the co-conspirator hearsay exception on this basis is 
waived.  Moreover, as the above-cited authority makes clear, there is no 
knowledge requirement.  The district court applied the correct legal standard and 
Blake has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
 
II. 
Blake Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence About The 
Activities Of And Investigation Into The Trafficking Conspiracy Headed By 
Ponce-Alba Because It Was Relevant To Oar’s And Blake’s Conspiracy To Extort 
Money From Those Who Owed Money To Ponce-Alba 
 
A. Introduction 
 
  During the testimony of Detective Bruner, Blake made a series of 
objections based on the assertion that evidence was rendered inadmissible by 
her ignorance, all of which were overruled by the district court.  The evidence to 
which Blake objected was:  
1. Oar’s statements to Detective Bruner that he (Oar) would be of use to 
Ponce-Alba to facilitate communications with people outside the jail because as 
an investigator for local attorneys he would be able to have communications with 
inmate Ponce-Alba unmonitored by jail staff.  (Tr., p. 496, L. 14 – p. 497, L. 8.) 
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2. Oar’s statements to Detective Bruner regarding what Ponce-Alba 
expected Oar to do on his behalf.  (Tr., p. 499, L. 21 – p. 500, L. 21.2) 
3. Detective Bruner’s testimony generally regarding his own investigation into 
Ponce-Alba’s activities.  (Tr., p. 505, Ls. 5-16.) 
4. Photographs of Ponce-Alba and two others involved in the drug trafficking 
conspiracy.  (Tr., p. 507, Ls. 10-25.) 
5. Detective Bruner’s testimony regarding why persons become confidential 
informants.  (Tr., p. 510, L. 13 – p. 511, L. 21.) 
6. Detective Bruner’s testimony regarding the risks of being a confidential 
informant.  (Tr., p. 522, L. 12 – p. 524, L. 23.) 
7. Whether a person with a high debt to Ponce-Alba would have trouble 
obtaining methamphetamine.  (Tr., p. 534, Ls. 11-17.) 
8. Documents provided by Oar to Detective Bruner in their third meeting.  
(Tr., p. 617, L. 4 – p. 618, L. 8.) 
 On appeal Blake argues this evidence “could not have played any role in 
[her] actions when she was completely unaware of them and thus they were not 
relevant to the case against her.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 21.)  This argument fails 
because neither this Court nor the district court was required to accept Blake’s 
claims of ignorance at face value and because, even if those claims of ignorance 
were accepted, a defendant’s knowledge of events shown by evidence is not a 
prerequisite to relevance.     
                                            
2 The district court ruled that this evidence was not admissible for the truth of the 
matter asserted because it was based on Ponce-Alba’s statements.  (Tr., p. 500, 
Ls. 1-3.) 
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de novo.   
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citations omitted). 
 
C. Blake’s Admission Of Knowledge Was Not A Requirement For Relevance 
 
 To be admissible, evidence must be relevant.  I.R.E. 401, 402.  Evidence 
that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has 
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be 
without the evidence, is relevant.  State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 
807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989).  “Whether a fact is material is determined by its 
relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.”  State v. Stevens, 146 
Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008) (citation omitted).   
 The state’s theory in this case was that Oar took over the collection of 
drug debts owed to Ponce-Alba while they were in jail together because Oar had 
someone outside the jail with whom he could communicate confidentially, Blake, 
who would perform tasks neither Oar nor Ponce-Alba were free to perform.  
(See, e.g., Tr., p. 1223, L. 15 – p. 1246, L. 7 (prosecutor’s closing argument).)  
Oar’s role, in addition to communicating with Ponce-Alba, included maintaining 
contact with Detective Bruner to try and learn information about the investigation 
of Ponce-Alba’s trafficking operation and to pass instructions to Blake regarding 
gathering information and delivering written demands to those who owed Ponce-
Alba money.  (Tr., p. 1237, L. 3 – p. 1239, L. 2; p. 1240, L. 23 – p. 1241, L. 25.)  
The state was entitled to present evidence of all of the conspiracy’s actions, 
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regardless of whether all conspirators were privy to, or even aware of, those 
actions. 
 This case is similar to State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 307 P.3d 1247 
(Ct. App. 2013).  In that case Tankovich entered a conspiracy with two other men 
(his brothers) to commit malicious harassment, a racially motivated crime.  Id. at 
226, 307 P.3d at 1252.  Tankovich argued that evidence that the other two co-
conspirators bore racists tattoos was irrelevant and inadmissible as to him.  Id. at 
225, 307 P.3d at 1251.  The Court reasoned the evidence was relevant as 
follows: 
In our view, evidence of William’s and Ira’s racially-based intent or 
motivation was relevant to whether Tankovich’s own actions were 
similarly motivated. If William and Ira harbored an intent to harass 
Kenneth because of his race, color, ancestry, or national origin, it is 
more likely that Tankovich’s participation in the alleged conspiracy 
was with that same criminal motive or purpose. That is, the motive 
of one co-conspirator is probative, though not necessarily 
conclusive, to prove the intent of another co-conspirator. Therefore, 
the tattoo evidence was relevant against Tankovich. 
 
Id. at 226, 307 P.3d at 1252.   
 The district court did not err by allowing admission of evidence of all the 
actions and statements by co-conspirators to demonstrate the purpose and goals 
of the conspiracy.  Blake was free to argue that she was ignorant of the actions 
of her co-conspirator and did not share his goals, but that did not render 
evidence of those actions and statements irrelevant.  The evidence showed that 
the debts in question were drug debts, and that the people who owed the debts 
knew of the collection methods often employed. Blake was free to claim that she 
did not share Oar’s understanding or his goals, but that claim was not binding on 
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the prosecution, the district court, or the jury.  Evidence of Oar’s actions and 
statements in furtherance of the conspiracy was relevant and properly admitted. 
 
III. 
Because The Evidence Was Admissible Against Both Oar And Blake, Blake Has 
Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of The Severance Motion Which Was Based 
On The Premise That The Evidence Was Not Admissible Against Her 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court denied the motion to sever.  (10/21/14 Tr., p. 17, L. 3 – p. 
21, L. 19; R., p. 89.)  Relevant to this appeal, it concluded that even if evidence 
was admissible only against Oar but not against Blake the potential unfair 
prejudice from limited admission of such evidence could be cured by appropriate 
instructions.  (10/21/14 Tr., p. 19, L. 19 – p. 20, L. 22; p. 21, Ls. 10-20.)  As noted 
above, however, this contingency never materialized. 
On appeal Blake argues that she was prejudiced by the joint trial because 
evidence should have been excluded from her trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-
25.)  For the reasons stated above, Blake has failed to show error in the 
admission of evidence and has therefore failed to show prejudice from denying 
severance of her trial from her co-conspirator’s trial.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “[A]n abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of 
a motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14.”  State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 
564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007).    
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C. Blake Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In Denying Her Motion For 
Severance  
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 14 governs motions to sever and provides, in relevant 
part: 
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a 
joinder of … defendants in a complaint, indictment or information or 
by such joinder for trial together, the court may … grant severance 
of defendants.   
 
“When reviewing an order denying a severance motion, the inquiry on appeal is 
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice 
resulted from a joint trial.”  State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 227, 307 P.3d 
1247, 1253 (Ct. App. 2013).  The district court will not be deemed to have 
abused its discretion “[i]n the absence of some specific showing of prejudice.”  
State v. Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 538, 817 P.2d 646, 652 (1991).   
 The district court ultimately denied the severance motion, holding that 
Blake had failed to show that even if some evidence was admissible only against 
Oar such would prejudice her trial.  At trial the district court ultimately held that all 
of the evidence related to the statements and actions of the co-conspirators was 
admissible against both co-conspirators, and therefore there was no evidence 
admitted at Blake’s joint trial that would not have been admitted at a severed trial.  
Because the evidence would have been the same, Blake has failed to show any 
prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 DATED this 6th day of May, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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